Abstract: This paper presents an aspect-oriented approach to integrated specification of functional and security requirements based on use-case-driven software development. It relies on explicit identification of security threats and threat mitigations. We first identify security threats with respect to use-case-based functional requirements in terms of security goals and the STRIDE category. Then, we suggest threat mitigations for preventing or reducing security threats. To capture the crosscutting nature of threats and mitigations, we specify them as aspects that encapsulate pointcuts and advice. This provides a structured way for separating functional and security concerns and for analysing the interaction between them.
Introduction
As a major source of cyber security risks, software security has become a growing concern (Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000; Howard and LeBlanc, 2003) . Adequate protection of software applications from attacks is yet beyond the capabilities of network-level and operating system-level security approaches (e.g., cryptography, firewall, and intrusion detection, to name a few) (Xu and Nygard, 2006) . To produce trustworthy software artifacts, it is important to incorporate principled use of assurance techniques throughout development and operation (Neumann, 2004) . In particular, the security requirements of a system-to-be need to be elicited and analysed in the early phases of the software development lifecycle. Security requirements are often considered non-functional or extra-functional. Their analysis is typically associated with that of functional requirements. For the integrated elicitation of functional and security requirements, the adversary's perspective of security has recently gained increasing attention. From the adversary's perspective, one can explicitly identify what kind of security threats exist and what mitigations are required to prevent or reduce the threats. For example, the misuse case method extends the use case approach (Alexander, 2002 (Alexander, , 2003 Firesmith, 2003; Opdahl, 2000, 2001) with misuse cases and mitigation cases. The anti-goal method in the goal-oriented requirements analysis generates attacks that violate security goals (van Lamsweerde et al., 2003; van Lamsweerde, 2004) . These methods, however, tend to tightly couple the functional and security requirements in that security threats and threat mitigations often crosscut multiple functional requirements. This requires close interaction between non-security system analysts and security experts and increases the difficulty in reusing security solutions for other applications. Effective mechanisms for separating security from functional concerns and for composing them when needed are highly desirable.
In this paper, we present an aspect-oriented approach to the separation and composition of security and functional requirements. It provides a structured way to handle the crosscutting nature of security threats and threat mitigations by incorporating aspect-orientation for requirements analysis. Based on the use case driven development, we specify security threats and threat mitigations as aspects that encapsulate pointcuts and advice. For a threat aspect, a pointcut is a collection of join points in use cases at which the use cases can be compromised (i.e., vulnerable points); a piece of advice describes how a threat can be realised. For a mitigation aspect, a pointcut is a collection of join points in use cases at which threats need to be mitigated; an advice describes what is required to mitigate the threats. As aspects for classes in Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) (Kiczales et al., 1997 (Kiczales et al., , 2001 ), threat and mitigation aspects are specified at the meta-level of use case descriptions. This facilitates separation of security requirements from functional requirements and improves reusability of security requirements (e.g., mitigation aspects).
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 gives an overview of our approach. Section 4 discusses how to identify and specify threat aspects. Section 5 describes the specification of mitigation aspects. Section 6 discusses the adaptability of our approach to requirements change. Section 7 presents a case study. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Related work
Software security is a complex and multi-faceted problem (Gollmann, 2003) . The adversary's perspective of software security analysis aims to secure software from potential attacks by first identifying security threats and then suggesting the requirements for mitigating these threats. Instead of imposing security goals (e.g., Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication -CIA) as immediate constraints on functional requirements, the adversary's perspective makes it explicit what a system-to-be needs to be protected from. Thus, this approach tends to be more practical and effective. Along this line, several methods for security requirements analysis have been proposed, including misuse or abuse cases (Alexander, 2002 (Alexander, , 2003 Firesmith, 2003; McDermott, 2001; McDermott and Fox, 1999; Sindre and Opdahl, 2000 , 2001 ), anti-goals (van Lamsweerde et al., 2003 van Lamsweerde, 2004) , abuse frames (Crook et al., 2002; Haley et al., 2004) , etc. The misuse/abuse case method extends the use case approach (Cockburn, 2000; Jacobson et al., 1994) with misuse cases and mitigation cases for the integrated elicitation of functional and security requirements. While our work is built upon the notions of misuse and mitigation use cases in the misuse case method, we exploit aspect-orientation to capture the crosscutting nature of threats and mitigations so that systems requirements are elicited in a more structured way. The structured specification facilitates understanding and analysis of the interplays between functional and security requirements. We also use security goals and the STRIDE threat category (Swiderski and Snyder, 2004) as heuristics for identifying security threats. Similarly, the abuse frame method introduces the notion of abuses to the problem frame approach for requirements analysis (Crook et al., 2002) . Recently, Haley et al. (2004) have improved this method by deriving security requirements from crosscutting threat descriptions. A threat description is a descriptive phrase of the form "performing action X on/to asset Y could cause harm Z ". In comparison, our work, based on the misuse case method, provides explicit notation for specification of aspects (such as pointcuts and advice). This facilitates application of aspect-orientation in subsequent software development activities such as aspect-oriented secure software design (Pauli and Xu, 2005; Nygard, 2005, 2006) . The anti-goal method in the goal-oriented requirements analysis can describe vulnerabilities or generate attacks that violate security goals (van Lamsweerde et al., 2003; van Lamsweerde, 2004) . As pointed out by Haley et al. (2004) , the closed nature of the domain model in this method tends to limit the vulnerabilities found during the generation of the anti-model. More work is also desirable for better structuring of the crosscutting threats, because vulnerabilities often crosscut multiple functional requirements. The 'actor, intention, goal' approach in the i* framework (Yu, 1997; Yu and Liu, 2001 ) models security and trust relationships as 'software goals': goals depending on another actor to satisfy them.
The threat modelling method (Howard and LeBlanc, 2003; Swiderski and Snyder, 2004) primarily focuses on secure software design, rather than security requirements analysis. It decomposes a system with data flow diagrams, models threats with attack trees, ranks the threats by decreasing risk, and chooses techniques to mitigate the threats. The threat modelling method also provides the STRIDE threat category for identifying application-specific threats. STRIDE stands for Spoofing identity, Tampering data, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege. It covers threats to a variety of security goals, including authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, confidentiality, availability, and access control. We adapt the STRIDE threat category as heuristics for threat identification at the requirements analysis phase, discarding those threat types that are dependent on a specific implementation or operating system (because they are not meaningful at the requirements level).
Aspect-orientation has been applied to secure programming as well as secure software design. For example, Win et al. (2001) and Viega et al. (2001) have discussed independently how AOP can enhance code security without even needing to modify the legacy code. Georg et al. (2002) have modelled design-level access control aspects with the UML. Unlike the above work, our focus is on aspect-orientation for elicitation of security requirements.
Our approach is also comparable to the existing work on aspect-oriented requirements analysis. "Aspect-oriented software development with use cases" (Jacobson and Ng, 2005) aims to realise the notion of crosscutting aspects within the context of use cases. In the traditional use case approach, extension use cases (or simply extensions), which are add-ons to base use cases, require designation of all the extension points a priori; peer concerns, which are distinct use cases with overlapping realisations, can result in the effects of tangling and scattering. To address these problems, Jacobson and Ng (2005) propose to keep peers and extensions separate with aspects. For example, the notion of extension pointcuts in extensions is devised to collect extension points in base use cases. Extension points are specified in the base use cases as well. This approach can retain the modularity of use cases in their realisations -each extension use case can have a corresponding implementation module. Treating all extensions as crosscutting aspects, however, is very restrictive. Extensions in the traditional approach often represent optional behaviours (Crook et al., 2002) , which do not have to be considered as crosscutting concerns or realised with aspects. Theme (Baniassad and Clarke, 2004) provides an aspect-oriented approach to analysis and design. Rashid et al. (2002 Rashid et al. ( , 2003 apply aspect-orientation to map Non-Functional Requirements (NFRs) onto functional requirements, where security is treated identically to other NFRs. In comparison, our work deals with security requirements analysis from the perspective of security threats.
The aspect-oriented approach to security requirements: an overview
Our approach is based on use case modelling, which primarily deals with the functional requirements of an application under development. The requirements are specified using UML notation for use case diagrams and textual descriptions. A use case is a sequence of actions performed by the system to yield an observable result of value to a particular user. Each use case describes the necessary action to perform the tasks, including the variations. The template for use case descriptions primarily includes the following entries (also called sections): Use case number, Use case name, Goal, Actor(s), Pre-conditions, Main flow of events, Alternate flows, Post-conditions, Special requirements, Extension points, etc. Security threats and threat mitigations are specified with respect to use case sections.
Based on the use case diagrams and textual descriptions, we identify crosscutting threats, which are potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious users to violate security goals (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and authentication) and cause harm to assets. For a use case, each section of its textual description is scrutinised to identify points of vulnerabilities. The threats that occur more than once across different sections of the same use case or different use cases are called crosscutting threats. A point in a use case section (e.g., step 1 in the main flow of events) is called a join point. If a join point is a point at which a security threat can happen, then it is called a threat point (a point of vulnerability). This follows the notion of join points in AOP (Kiczales et al., 1997 (Kiczales et al., , 2001 ). The various join points that are threatened by a particular threat are grouped together in a pointcut. In other words, we use a threat pointcut to describe the collection of the join points vulnerable to a common threat. Thus, each threat aspect consists of a group of pointcuts and their advice (how the threats can happen at corresponding threat points).
After crosscutting threats are specified, we further identify the requirements for mitigating the threats. Each mitigation is represented as an aspect. A mitigation aspect consists of mitigation pointcuts and advice. Each mitigation pointcut includes one or more threat pointcuts, meaning that a mitigation can apply to one or more threat. A piece of mitigation advice contains the mitigation logic required to counter the identified threats. Therefore, each mitigation aspect indicates a unit of the security concern.
In general, the process of use case modelling, threat modelling, and mitigation modelling is an iterative one. The main results of this process include requirements descriptions in the forms of use cases, threat aspects, and mitigation aspects. For an application with a number of crosscutting threats, the relationships between use cases and threats, and between use cases and mitigations can be very complex. To help different stakeholders understand requirements specifications, our approach provides three different views that address the following questions:
• For a given use case, what are the identified threats and mitigations?
• The above different views are realised by the weaving process of aspect-orientation in our approach. We can use hyperlinks among descriptions of use cases, threat aspects and mitigation aspects.
Identification and specification of crosscutting threats
Modelling of security threats aims to identify crosscutting threats that threaten the use cases and specify them as threat aspects. It involves:
• identifying threat points with respect to use cases
• describing how security threats can happen at the threat points (i.e., advice)
• grouping threat points with respect to the same threat into a threat pointcut and bundling the threat pointcut with the corresponding threat description to form a threat aspect.
To identify and categorise as many security threats as possible, we check each point in a use case (main flow, alternate flows, preconditions, post-conditions, etc.) to see if it can be exploited by malefactors. We use the CIA security goals and STRIDE as heuristics. For example, 'Man in the Middle' is a threat to the CIA goals, whereas 'Modifying customer information' comes under the 'Tempering data' category of STRIDE. An analyst can ask questions regarding what actions will disrupt the normal functioning of the system and try to figure out the ways and effects of misuses that can be done to any of the points in the use cases. Examples of such questions include "Can a non-authorised user view the confidential data?", "Can a malicious user modify the customer record data in the database?" and "Can someone deny valid users services from the application?" Some of the examples of STRIDE threats include denial of purchase of an item by a registered user, unauthorised access to the customer databases, temporary unavailability of web server, tap communication, replay of message, modification of website, etc. The implementation-level threats such as those linked with DNS servers, authentication protocols or encryption technologies, etc., are not considered because they are not meaningful at the requirements level.
It is important to think about the potential vulnerabilities according to both effects and causes. The STRIDE is an effect classification. A security analyst needs to analyse the causes of the vulnerabilities. The traditional security goals such as integrity, confidentiality, privacy, availability, etc., are helpful for identifying other potential threats in each of the points in a use case description. For example, "A customer may purchase products at a reduced price" is an application specific threat to the integrity goal.
While identifying threats in the use cases which involve such relationships as include, extend or generalisation with other use cases, we need to treat these use cases as independently as is feasible from other use cases to which they are related. The threats that threaten a base use case in an extension relationship may be different from those that threaten the extension use cases depending on the business logic that the extension use case represents. Similarly, the vulnerabilities of a parent use case in a generalisation relationship may include some of the same vulnerabilities of the child use case, but there may be unique threats that threaten the child use case and not the parent use case and vice versa. They need to be treated independently for the purpose of threat identification. Also, the shared portions of a use case in an inclusion relationship may be exposed to vulnerabilities that may or may not be dependent on the base use cases that include it. Hence, the threat analyst not only needs to treat these use cases as independent ones but also needs to be aware of the sections of the use cases that act as the bridge between the relationships. Those steps of the use cases which act as the point of extension or inclusion need to be examined with more attention so as to determine threats that may be due to instances of data transfer or transfer of control between the relationships.
It should be noted that there can be multiple threats at the same point in one use case. For example, "The customer submits payment details" (Step 6 of the main flow of events) in the Order Goods use case described in Table 1 is vulnerable to such threats as block system, replay of message, modification of messages, tap communication and modification of data stored in files/databases. Similarly, a single threat can threaten various use cases at different sections. For example, "modification of data stored in files/databases" threatens the main flow Steps 1 and 2 ("The customer enters the register customer section" and "The system displays the new customer registration form") in the Register Customer use case described in Table 2 and the main flow Steps 1, 2 and 6 ("The customer enters order goods section", "The system displays the customer's account detail" and "The customer submits payment details") in the Order Goods use case described in Table 1 . Thus, modification of data stored in files/databases can be considered as a crosscutting threat.
Table 1
The order goods use case Use case number 2 Use case name Order goods Goal To order goods from the system Customer Actor(s) System Pre-conditions 1 The customer is registered to order goods 2 The customer has entered registration details (e.g., user name and password) and the customer is logged on to the ordering section 1 The customer enters order goods section 2 The system displays the customer's account details 3 The customer enters its identity Main flow of events 4 The customer provides delivery details 5 The system calculates and displays the price of the goods ordered 6 The customer submits payment details 7 The system confirms the result of transaction 8 The system collects the details of the order 9 The system processes the order Post-conditions 1 The order and its details are entered in the system and the order is processed
Once a crosscutting threat is identified, we further describe the threat. In our approach, the template for threat description primarily includes the following entries (most of them are similar to those for use cases): Threat name, Threat category, Objective, Preconditions, Main flow of events, Table 3 shows a simplified version of the "Modification of Stored Data Aspect" in our case study. The pointcut named 'ModData' lists the threat points in the Register Customer and Order Goods use cases. For brevity, other use cases threatened by the threat are not listed. The threat name identifies the threat uniquely. The attacker's objective in employing this threat is noted in the threat objective field. The threat preconditions field describes the required conditions before the attack can be carried out. The threat flow narrates the steps of the attack. Threat post-conditions specify the effect if the attack is successful. The alternate flow section identifies any other sequence of steps that can be implemented to successfully carry out the same attack. Any possible assumptions or remarks regarding the threat aspect are noted under the remarks field. Table 3 Modification of stored data aspect
Threat name Modification of stored data Category
Tampering of data Objective
To change the data stored in the files/databases of the website Pre-conditions 1 The system is accessible over network 2 The intruder knows the credentials of an authorised system user such as administrator 
Specification of mitigation aspects
Specifying mitigation aspects involves identifying and grouping mitigation pointcuts, designing the mitigation advice, and bundling the mitigation pointcuts with mitigation advice into mitigation aspects. In our approach, the template of mitigation advice includes the following main entries: Advice name, Category (the threat category the advice aims to mitigate), Objective, Preconditions, Main flow, Post-conditions, Alternate flow (any other sequence of steps of mitigation that can achieve the stated objective), and Remarks. They are similar to those for use cases and threats. Table 4 shows the Encrypt Stored Data mitigation aspect that counteracts the threat 'Modification of Stored Data' and promotes data integrity by authorising only valid users to modify data. The advice aims at a secured data repository by following the steps described in the main flow section. The mitigation pointcut is the same as ModData defined for the threat to be mitigated. It means the mitigation aspect will apply to the threat only.
In our approach, one mitigation aspect can apply to multiple threats with similar nature by collecting the threat pointcuts of the threats into the same mitigation pointcut. For example, a mitigation aspect responsible for ensuring non-repudiation may be able to mitigate the man in the middle attack and the replay of message attack. The mitigation can achieve this by representing mitigations alleviating both threats in mitigation flow and alternate flow sections of the mitigation aspect. Also, there may be requirement of employing more than one mitigation advice at a particularly critical join point, which acts as a point of extension or inclusion in a use case. These decisions are largely based on the requirements analysis and security needs of the application. Therefore, a mitigation pointcut represents a set of threat points threatened by one or more threats. They indicate the places where the mitigation logic is inserted. A mitigation advice contains the mitigations steps required to counter the identified threats. Threats may threaten those use cases that involves such relationships as inclusion, generalisation and extension. The mitigation techniques are dependent on the threats that expose the use cases and not on the relationships they have among themselves. It is likely that the mitigation advice employed by the base use case in an inclusion or extension relationship is different from that employed in the use case they extend or include. Similarly, the mitigation advice used by various parent use cases in a generalisation relationship may or may not be the same as the child use cases depending on the business logic of the use cases and the threats they are exposed to. When the decision needs to be made regarding which mitigation advice is to be fired at a particular use case step, one has to critically analyse the steps of extension or inclusion as they act as bridges between the use cases.
Adaptability to requirements change: a discussion
One of the challenges of requirements engineering is managing changes. The changes in requirements need to be constantly tracked and the relevant documents need to be updated to reflect the most recent set of specifications.
In our approach, we employ use cases to represent the functional requirements of the system. The security concerns are dependent on the use case specifications. The various steps of the use cases are treated as join points. Therefore, changes in requirements will result in change in the use case specifications, and that in turn will necessitate the modification of various models used in our approach.
Here we discuss three situations of requirements change:
• addition of use cases or new steps in existing use cases
• deletion of use cases or steps in existing use cases
• modification of the steps in existing use cases.
Addition of use cases or new steps in existing use cases
We consider the situation where new use cases or new steps (e.g., the preconditions, main flow, post-conditions, or alternate flow sections) to existing use cases are added. The security analyst needs to identify threats for these additional steps based on methods discussed in the crosscutting threat modelling phase. If the threats already fall into an existing threat category, they are grouped with the existing crosscutting threats and the new steps in the use cases are added to the list of pointcuts threatened by those threats. If new crosscutting threats are identified, those threats are represented as new threat models. Appropriate mitigation advices need to be modelled to mitigate the newly identified threats. These result in new crosscutting threat aspects and mitigation aspects modelled based on the new threat and advice descriptions, respectively. The various views also need to be updated in the aspect weaving phase reflecting the new aspects and the newly added use cases or the new use case steps added to existing use cases.
Deletion of use cases or steps in existing use cases
We consider the situation where complete use cases or a few steps from existing use cases are deleted from the use case specifications. The security analyst needs to note the threats associated with these deleted use case steps. The join points representing the deleted steps of the use cases are deleted from the existing pointcuts. At this step, all the pointcut models are updated. If the updated pointcut models have at least two join points, they are left untouched. The crosscutting threat model, which represents the threat relevant to the deleted pointcut, is deleted along with the associated crosscutting threat aspect. If there is one to one relationship with the threat aspect to any of the mitigation aspects, that mitigation aspect is modified or deleted. The various views also need to be updated in aspect weaving phase reflecting the modified or deleted aspects and the use case steps.
Modification of the steps in existing use cases
We consider the situation where steps of existing use cases are modified. The security analyst needs to identify threats for these modified steps based on methods discussed in the threat modelling phase. If no additional threats are identified, then no further changes are required. If the additional threats already fall into existing threat categories, they are grouped with the existing threats and the modified steps in the use cases are redistributed among the list of pointcuts threatened by those threats. If new threats are identified, those threats are represented as new threat models. Appropriate mitigation advices need to be modelled to mitigate the newly identified threats. These result in new threat aspects and mitigation aspects modelled based on the new threat and mitigation advice descriptions, respectively. The various views also need to be updated in aspect weaving phase reflecting the new aspects and the modified use cases steps.
A case study
We have conducted a case study on the aspect-oriented requirements analysis of an online shopping application which sells goods on the internet. It provides a simple yet common application domain that is known to a majority of software developers. The security needs for such an application have become a growing concern as it involves financial transactions. In this section, we describe the case study.
The basic functional requirements of the application are outlined below:
• new customers need to register themselves on the website before ordering goods
• the registration process involves filling up a form with customer's personal information such as user name, password, shipping address, credit card information
• any returning user can log in the website using his or her credentials
• customers can change their passwords and other information at any time
• customers can browse different pages before deciding to buy any product
• customers can pay for their purchased goods online using a credit/debit card
• customers can post and view product reviews
• the administrator should be able to log in for routine maintenance of the website
• the management can offer discounts on the products for sale. Thus, product prices can be changed by an authorised user. As the case study focused on the system requirements, it did not deal with the implementation-level threats that may arise due to the security flaws of the technologies used in the later stages of software development. Thus, we only used the STRIDE threats that we found were relevant to the requirements phase. We realise that although the threat list in this study covers different categories of threats, it is by no means exhaustive. Other security analysts may find more threats and vulnerability points in the use cases depending on their level of expertise.
One of the valuable lessons we have learned from the case study is the fashion of employing the ideas of security goals and STRIDE threats to determine the points of vulnerability and potential threats. It takes a great deal of understanding to categorise those threats and then to compare different use cases to separate the crosscutting threats. The process of threat modelling becomes relatively easier once we start thinking like a hacker -focusing on the activities that should not be done by the system instead of thinking about how the system should behave. This negative thinking regarding system behaviours helps in identifying a number of threat points. We also find that, once the threat modelling is done, it is relatively easy to figure out the mitigation aspects as we know the threats to the assets. The focus is then shifted to plugging in mitigation requirements. Our experience also suggests some knowledge about software security along with the use cases can help practitioners better use our approach.
While a particular mitigation may potentially prevent more than one threat, results of our case study indicate that one threat can be addressed collectively by multiple mitigations. These crosscutting features are successfully addressed in our approach.
Conclusions
We present an aspect-oriented approach to security requirements analysis based on the use case driven elicitation of functional requirements. Although the approach heavily relies on the use case descriptions for identification of the security threats, threat aspects and mitigation aspects are separated from the use case descriptions. They do not impose any change to the use case descriptions. The aspect weaving mechanism can provide different views to help us better understand the crosscutting relationships between threats (or mitigations) and use cases. If we import threat and mitigation aspects to a new application, what we need to do is to update threat and mitigation pointcuts by pinpointing the threat points in the use cases of the new application. Therefore, the aspect-oriented treatment of threats and mitigations can improve reusability of security solutions (particularly mitigation aspects). Reusing existing threat and mitigation aspects will lower the required level of security expertise for system analysts to identify and mitigate security threats. It can also facilitate adoption of new mitigations for the threats without the need to modify the use cases. In addition, dealing with frequent changes of requirements is a major challenge to software development. In our proposed solution, the threat and mitigation aspects are separated from the use cases. This makes our aspect-oriented approach to threat-driven security requirements analysis more flexible than the existing misuse case method.
Generally speaking, no system is absolutely secure. Even threat mitigations (e.g., SSL) can have their own threats Nygard, 2005, 2006) . To mitigate threats to mitigation aspects, threat pointcuts in threat aspects need to be extended to allow for threat points in mitigation advice. To do so, the mitigation pointcuts should also allow for mitigation points in mitigation advice. As a result, threat-mitigation relations may be interweaved within several levels of requirements specification. In this case, the potential inconsistence has to be checked carefully. Our future work will investigate this issue. We also plan to apply our approach to the development of large-scale systems.
